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Chapter 1
Free Will & Empirical Arguments 
for Epiphenomenalism
Nadine Elzein
Abstract While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, 
worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly 
featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of 
epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it 
entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the 
causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not 
entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, we 
find, for the most part, nothing to suggest that free will is inconsistent with the pres-
ence of unconscious neural precursors to choices. It is only if we adopt highly non- 
naturalistic assumptions about the mind (e.g. if we embrace Cartesian dualism and 
locate free choice in the non-physical realm) that it seems plausible to suppose that 
the neuroscientific data generates a threat to free will.
1.1  Introduction
In philosophy, while concerns about mental causation span back centuries, the ques-
tion of whether epiphenomenalism undermines free will is surprisingly underex-
plored. In contemporary literature, worries about mental causation tend to derive 
from the concern that if there is an adequate physical explanation for every event, 
this renders the mental causally superfluous (Malcolm 1968, Kim 1989, 1993, 1998, 
2005; O’Connor and Churchill 2010). Philosophers have puzzled over the implica-
tions of this problem for the viability of non-reductive, emergentist, or dualist theo-
ries of mind, but there has been little connection between this dispute and the 
traditional free will problem.
In contrast, in the neurosciences, researchers typically suppose that any threat to 
the causal efficacy of the conscious mind is also a threat to free will. Research sug-
gesting that our consciousness of choices occurs too late to causally influence them 
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4(Libet et al. 1979; Libet 1982, 1985; Soon et al. 2008; Wegner 2002, 2004) has been 
taken to be interesting primarily because it’s taken to have drastic implications for 
free will.
There are three possible explanations for this curious disparity:
 1. The empirical case for epiphenomenalism reveals a distinct epiphenomenal 
threat; one that has more serious implications for freedom than any threat identi-
fied by philosophical arguments for epiphenomenalism.
 2. Philosophers are oblivious to the threat that epiphenomenalism poses to free 
will.
 3. Empirical researchers are mistaken in supposing that the epiphenomenalist threat 
they identify really has serious implications for free will.
I will argue that explanation (3) is right. It is not obvious that the empirical argu-
ments for epiphenomenalism really do have serious implications for freedom and 
moral responsibility.
1.2  The Philosophical Worries
Puzzles about how mind and body causally interact have been discussed at least 
since Elisabeth of Bohemia’s famous correspondence with Descartes in 1643 
(Atherton 1994, pp. 11–21). Such puzzles led theorists, even close to Descartes’ 
time, to seek alternatives to Cartesian interactionism, such as occasionalism (e.g. 
Malebranche 1674, 1997), parallelism (e.g. Leibniz 1695, 1989), and monism, both 
idealist (e.g. Berkeley 1710, 1982) and materialist (e.g. Hobbes 1651, 1994; 
Cavendish 1664, 2017). And at least since Hodgson (1880) some philosophers have 
embraced epiphenomenalism.
While contemporary philosophers have predominantly hoped (much like Hobbes 
and Cavendish in Descartes’ own time) that we can make sense of mental causation 
by rejecting dualism in favour of physicalism, many have been pessimistic about the 
prospects of completely reducing the mental to the physical (Putnam 1967; Fodor 
1974; Block and Fodor 1972; Pylyshyn 1984). And “causal exclusion” arguments 
purport to show that non-reductive physicalists (no less than dualists) may be stuck 
with problems of mental causation.
As Kim argues, if physics is “causally complete”, every physical event has a suf-
ficient causal explanation that appeals only to other physical events. This poses a 
problem: if we have a sufficient causal explanation of an event in physical terms, 
this seems to render mental phenomena causally redundant. Unless we are willing 
(implausibly) to posit constant overdetermination, the mental realm will turn out to 
be epiphenomenal (Kim 1989, 1993, 1998).
Non-reductive physicalists have supposed that every mental event is realised by 
a physical event, and hence that mental events may be causally effective on account 
of their physical underpinnings (e.g. Davidson 1970). But even if this does make 
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mental features (Stoutland 1980; Honderich 1982; Sosa 1984).
Suppose that event A is Zina’s spitefully dropping a statue into a pond and event 
B is the statue sinking. Event A has certain characteristics, among them its spiteful-
ness. But this looks irrelevant to any explanation of why A caused B. The spite with 
which Zina dropped the statue is not part of the reason why it sank. Similarly, if an 
event’s physical realisers sufficiently explain why the event caused another event, 
the fact that these events also realise mental properties will seem irrelevant. While 
mental events seem to be realised by causally effective physical events, these events 
do not seem to be causally effective in virtue of their mental qualities.
These issues are hotly debated, and won’t be further explored. Epiphenomenalism 
remains a highly controversial philosophical thesis.
1.3  The Neuroscientific Worries
Concerns about the irrelevance of the conscious mind in decision-making emerged 
with Libet’s famous study, purporting to show that choices are initiated by uncon-
scious neural events prior to agents becoming consciously aware of forming an 
intention to act (Libet et al. 1979; Libet 1982, 1985). Recent variations on Libet- 
style experiments (Soon et al. 2008) provide even stronger evidence of unconscious 
neural precursors to decisions, and it’s often supposed that such research raises 
serious doubts about free will (e.g. Wegner 2002, 2004).
The alleged threat arises from the suggestion that our sense of conscious will is 
epiphenomenal. There are notably some serious problems, however, with reaching 
this conclusion on the basis of the data. Firstly, the neural precursors do not corre-
late perfectly with the decisions that follow them. Libet himself speculated that 
agents had some conscious power of veto right up until the last moment, and that 
this gives us reason to reject the epiphenomenalist conclusion (Libet 1985, 2003). 
But Libet’s reasoning on this matter has garnered serious criticism (e.g. Gallagher 
2006).
Studies have also focused on getting participants to make an arbitrary choice 
about when to press a button or which of two buttons to press, with no strong con-
siderations present in favour of either action. This experimental situation is quite far 
removed from real life decisions. Perhaps we can delegate this sort of decision- 
making to unconscious processes more easily than decisions with real consequences, 
which may require more conscious engagement (Waller 2012).
Waller suggested the studies could be redesigned to test whether morally signifi-
cant decisions would be similarly initiated unconsciously, by asking participants to 
make choices with significant outcomes. E.g. gambling with funds that are going to 
go to a charitable cause. This has since been tested experimentally (Maoz et  al. 
forthcoming) and the results corroborate Waller’s contention that greater conscious 
input may be present in the case of morally significant choices than is present in that 
of entirely arbitrary ones. This casts doubt on any inference from the traditional 
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ness more broadly.
Moreover, even in the case of arbitrary choice, it’s not clear whether there may 
be causally relevant conscious activity correlated with the neural precursors to con-
scious awareness of the choice. If these neural precursors correlate with other con-
scious activity that typically precedes a choice – contemplating pressing the button, 
deliberating about pressing the button, etc.  – it would be unsurprising that such 
events tended to both precede choices and influence the chances of the agent making 
a particular choice. This would not obviously show that the conscious mind was 
irrelevant to the choices subsequently made (Nahmias 2010; Baumeister et  al. 
2011).
It would be premature to conclude that consciousness has no causal role to play 
in initiating choices, given the present state of research. Though it is possible that as 
such research progresses, stronger neuroscientific evidence may emerge.
1.3.1  What Is “Conscious Will”?
Suppose we take this alleged epiphenomenal threat seriously. There is still some 
unclarity regarding how the experimental data allows us reach the conclusion that 
free will is illusory.
Firstly, the notion of “conscious will” is vague. The language of “conscious will” 
somewhat obscures the fact that willing is usually understood, at least in contempo-
rary thought, to be a sort of mental state, and not a special faculty the agent pos-
sesses. The term “consciousness” also needs disambiguation. When we say that 
“consciousness” or “conscious will” is epiphenomenal, what do we mean by this?
There are numerous different ways in which mental states might be considered 
“conscious”. At least three categories look directly relevant:
 1. Phenomenal consciousness:
For present purposes we may group together such things as qualitative states, 
phenomenal states, raw feels, and what-it-is-like states. There seem to be directly 
sensible qualities to some of our mental states, which provide the character of 
our subjective experiences. Common examples include sensations of emotion, 
colour, taste, or pain. As well as ‘qualia’ or ‘raw feels’ this category may include 
other dimensions of what an experience is like for its subject. It is these phenom-
enal aspects of consciousness that are sometimes thought to be difficult to cap-
ture in objective or physical terms (1958, Nagel 1974; Jackson 1982, 1986, 
Block 1990).
 2. Access consciousness:
For present purposes, we may group together access consciousness, informa-
tional consciousness, and mental states being personally available to awareness. 
These categories involve being aware that we are subject to a mental state in such 
a way that we are able to report being in such a state, and able to take the state 
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have this sort of access to a state, there must be any particular character to the 
experience, so access consciousness is typically distinguished from phenomenal 
consciousness (Block 1995).
 3. Intentional/representational content:
The philosophical literature, in contrast to neuroscientific literature, often focuses 
on the intentional or representational contents of mental states; what our beliefs 
and desires, say, are about. Epiphenomenalism is sometimes thought to render 
these contents causally irrelevant. This seems orthogonal to problems of con-
sciousness understood in either access or phenomenal terms. Even unconscious 
states can have intentional content. And some philosophers suggest that phenom-
enal features of consciousness are entirely distinct from intentional ones 
(Peacocke 1983; Block 1996).
The idea of “conscious will” tends to be invoked frequently, but poorly defined. 
It is not obvious which sort of consciousness is supposed to (a) have to be causally 
efficacious in order for free will to be possible and (b) be rendered epiphenomenal 
by the data.
1.4  Epiphenomenalism and Freedom of the Will
Suppose that we have reason to take the threats to the causal efficacy of conscious-
ness identified in the neuroscientific literature seriously. It is not immediately obvi-
ous what the implications are for free will. In order to assess these implications, we 
need some idea of what free will entails. Let’s take a brief look at some of the lead-
ing accounts of free will and at the sorts of requirements  typically thought to be 
necessary preconditions of it.
As the free will dispute has typically focused on determinism rather than epiphe-
nomenalism, the accounts tend to be divided up in terms of their compatibility or 
incompatibility with determinism; the thesis that the future is fixed by the laws of 
nature and the way things were in the past.
Popular compatibilist conditions of freedom include the ability to act on the basis 
of one’s choices (Moore 1903; Ayer 1954; Smart 1961. 1966; Lewis 1981; Berofsky 
2002), the ability to respond to reasons (Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Wolf 1990), and 
the ability to make choices based on one’s deeper values (Frankfurt 1971, Dworkin 
1970; Watson 1975).
Incompatibilists typically endorse similar conditions as necessary for free will, 
but deny that they are sufficient. They tend to also require either that agents are able, 
in a robust sense, to choose otherwise (Kane 2000, 2002, 2004; Moya 2006, 2007, 
2011; Ekstrom 2003; Elzein 2017; Franklin 2018; Kittle 2018) or else that agents 
are, in some sense, the “ultimate sources” of their own choices (Stump 1999a, b, 
2003; Pereboom 2000, 2001, 2003; Zagzebski 2000, 2010; Timpe 2007, 2008; 
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require the falsity of determinism.
Note that determinism is unrelated to epiphenomenalism. The question of 
whether some account of freedom is compatible with determinism has no implica-
tions at all for the question of whether it is compatible with epiphenomenalism. 
While it’s surprisingly common to find the two issues conflated (Nahmias (2010) 
cites a number of instances of this error), the two theses are unconnected.
How do we get from the premise that certain conscious features are epiphenom-
enal to a conclusion about free will? There must be something required for free will 
that would plausibly be precluded by the supposed epiphenomenal status of those 
conscious features. We should therefore look at commonly defended accounts of 
free will to see whether any of them include requirements that might plausibly be 
impossible to meet if these conscious features turn out to be epiphenomenal.
There are, however, some restrictions on what sorts of requirement would actu-
ally be fruitful here. Proponents of the empirical argument would be well advised to 
search for requirements which are not only plausibly necessary for free will, but 
which also meets the following criteria:
 1. The requirement must be plausibly inconsistent with epiphenomenalism.
 2. While the requirement must be a necessary condition of free and responsible 
action, it should not also be a prerequisite for any action (even unfree ones).
 3. The requirement must be consistent with the thesis that the mental supervenes on 
the physical.
The reason for the first condition is obvious. Unless some requirement for free-
dom is also ruled out by epiphenomenalism, we will not be able to use it in conjunc-
tion with epiphenomenalism as a basis from which to infer free will scepticism.
The second requirement might look mysterious. If something is required for 
action, then it must, a fortiori, be required for free action. Hence if we can provide 
a necessary condition of action that would be ruled out by epiphenomenalism, we 
certainly have a good case for free will scepticism. This is true, but it means the 
argument is likely to prove too much. While scepticism about free will is commonly 
thought to be a surprising but nonetheless potentially compelling conclusion, scep-
ticism about agency is far less plausible, and is likely to be seen as an unpalatable 
implication. Some may be willing to bite this bullet, but for others the implication 
that there are no agents or actions is more likely to be regarded as a reductio of any 
argument that led to it. Hence the argument will lose a good deal of plausibility if it 
can only proceed to a sceptical conclusion about free will via a much stronger scep-
tical conclusion about agency.
The final requirement, that it must be consistent with the claim that the mental 
supervenes on the physical, seems a basic prerequisite of our having any reason to 
take the neuroscientific literature seriously in the first place. The entire idea of 
studying the mind via an investigation of the brain would be misguided unless we 
were willing to grant this thesis.
The question is whether any of the standard accounts of free will posit require-
ments that meet these criteria. While the categories of “incompatibilist” and 
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so relevant to the threat from epiphenomenalism. For present purposes, I will divide 
purported preconditions of free will into those that are also preconditions for any 
action and those that are preconditions specifically for free action. The latter will 
also be divided into naturalistic requirements and non-naturalistic ones.
1.4.1  Purported Conditions of Action
Under what conditions does behaviour count as genuine action? At a minimum, it 
must be purposive or goal-directed. But that is not enough; the behaviour of a sim-
ple machine could be goal-directed. Plausibly, it must be consciously goal directed. 
The agent must have some intention in acting, and must be aware of it. This is what 
seems to be lacking in the case of automatistic action, like sleepwalking, which is 
not typically classed as genuine agency. While sleepwalkers seem to carry out inten-
tions, they are not aware of what they are doing.
This certainly includes a lack of access consciousness; they are unable to report 
or further reflect on what they are doing. It may be plausible to suppose that agents 
who are dreaming enjoy phenomenal consciousness; they are, in some sense, aware 
of the phenomenal qualities presented to them in their dreams. But such agents 
certainly lack phenomenal consciousness with respect to what they are actually 
doing. The intentions with which they act are disconnected from the behaviour 
that’s actually occurring.
It seems plausible that agents need access consciousness in order to count as act-
ing at all, and plausible, though more controversial, that agents might need phenom-
enal consciousness to count as acting at all (Shepherd 2015a). The latter will depend 
on whether a “phenomenal zombie” could still perform actions; a question which is 
not east to answer (Smithies 2012).
But it is one thing to suppose that agency requires consciousness and quite 
another to suppose that it requires our mental states to be causally efficacious in 
virtue of their conscious qualities, or that the conscious awareness must temporally 
precede the initiation of choices.
Consider automatic behaviour; the sort that’s performed on “autopilot”. Often 
agents lack awareness when performing actions that are highly rehearsed; but it’s 
typically thought to count as acting nonetheless. This is because they are easily able 
to acquire conscious awareness. If you are driving, you might not be aware of indi-
cating to turn, but if someone asks you to explain yourself, you can easily become 
aware of what you are doing. In this case, it is not obvious that the awareness must 
precede the initiation of behaviour; rather, the behaviour and the intentions that 
motivate it must be easily accessible to conscious awareness (Levy and Bayne 2004; 
Levy 2011; Levy 2013, 2014a).
The reason why access consciousness seems important is because it seems to 
characterise the sorts of mental processes that might look especially relevant for our 
control over our behaviour. We tend to be able to consciously report the sorts of 
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processing that that directly pertain to our deliberate goals, and which might be 
amenable to rational reflection and scrutiny. In contrast, much of the activity that 
occurs below the level of awareness is outside of our direct control, but may none-
theless be broadly governed by these higher level aims.
Various authors have tried to elucidate the importance of the sorts of processing 
that tend to be  available to conscious awareness in this way. Shepherd (2015b) 
argues that the sorts of processing that are typically available to conscious intro-
spection are those involved in “executive functions”. The sorts of processes that are 
not available to conscious awareness are those that occur at a sub-personal level, 
and are not directly accessible to conscious reflection. These are typically subordi-
nate to executive processing. E.g. our explicit intention to pick something up directs 
our motor processes. Relatedly, Gallagher (2006) notes that we may be expected to 
directly cognise features of our situation and environment, while subpersonal pro-
cesses remain largely inaccessible at that level of cognition, despite being broadly 
directed by processes at that level. Others have noted that our proximal intentions, 
even if formed fairly automatically, may be directed by distal intentions that are 
typically available to conscious awareness (Nahmias 2010; Schlosser 2013).
Genuine action typically involves processes of which we are consciously aware, 
since these have an “executive” or “directing” role. But there is no obvious reason 
to suppose that the conscious awareness itself must be doing the causing. Conscious 
awareness is an indicator that the processes in question are the sort that characterise 
genuine agency. But this doesn’t entail that such processes must be caused by con-
scious awareness. And it certainly does not seem as if the “phenomenal feeling” 
needs to cause the behaviour (Walter 2014). It seems highly dubious to suppose that 
our intentions must be causally effective in virtue of either access consciousness or 
phenomenal consciousness, even if they must be available to either sort of conscious 
awareness.
A more plausible suggestion is that we need to act in virtue of the intentional or 
representational contents of our mental states in order to count as genuinely acting; 
that what I desire and believe must be causally relevant to my behaviour. But this is 
not the focus of any of the empirical literature that aims to undermine free will. It is 
only really addressed in the philosophical literature. Moreover, this threat, if taken 
seriously, is far more extensive than just a threat to the possibility of free will. It 
potentially entails that the entire mental realm is devoid of all influence. Few phi-
losophers embrace this conclusion.
Even if agency is possible, however, free agency might not be. Epiphenomenal 
arguments might threaten our ability to act freely or be held morally accountable. 
Let’s consider broadly naturalistic conditions of freedom; those that do not posit 
phenomena beyond the reach of scientific investigation.
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1.4.2  Naturalistic Purported Conditions of Freedom
1.4.2.1  Acting on the Basis of Choices
It is fairly universally supposed that moral responsibility requires the ability to act 
in accordance with our choices. If an agent is imprisoned or paralysed, or if there 
are constraints and impediments that hinder her ability to act as she intends to, this 
would undermine her freedom and her moral accountability (Moore 1903; Ayer 
1954; Smart 1961; Lewis 1981; Berofsky 2002).
But epiphenomenal arguments pose no threat to this ability. This requirement 
says nothing about the way that our decisions are initiated or about the features in 
virtue of which they count as causally efficacious. It is usually understood simply in 
terms of counterfactual dependence; an agent meets this requirement if she acts as 
she has chosen to and would have acted otherwise if she had chosen to act other-
wise. Libet-style studies purport to undermine the causal relevance of conscious 
awareness to agents’ choices; they do not purport to undermine the causal relevance 
of agents’ choices to their subsequent actions.
1.4.2.2  Reasons Responsiveness
It’s often supposed that our decisions would need to be responsive to reasons in 
order for us to count as morally responsible (Wolf 1990; Fischer and Ravizza 1998). 
Schlosser (2013) and Levy (2011, 2013, 2014a, b) have argued that there is a crucial 
link between conscious awareness and the ability to respond to reasons. They both 
suppose that it is (broadly) access consciousness that is required for this ability, as 
opposed to phenomenal consciousness.
The reason why we might suppose that access consciousness is crucial to reasons- 
responsiveness is that only this sort of conscious processing seems to be governed 
by norms of consistency in such a way as to be potentially integrated into a rational 
outlook. Our unconscious processing tends to work in an associative way, and not to 
be governed by norms of consistency (Levy 2013, 2014a, b).
This gives us reason to suppose that we can only be morally responsible for pro-
cesses that are accessible to conscious awareness. But it does not seem to entail that 
our choices must be initiated consciously, or that they must be causally efficacious 
in virtue of conscious features.
Automatic action is typically driven by the sorts of intention that can easily be 
brought to our conscious awareness, even if we often lack awareness when initiating 
the action (Levy and Bayne 2004; Levy 2011). There seems no reason to suppose 
that such behaviour is immune to introspection and rational scrutiny.
Moreover, the crucial point for reasons-responsiveness is not that conscious 
awareness itself must be doing the causal work, but that the sorts of processes of 
which we are consciously aware are the sorts that are governed by standards of 
rational consistency. Even if such processes were initiated by unconscious events, 
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this would not stop them from being governed by these norms, so it would not pre-
clude them from being reasons-responsive.
1.4.2.3  Harmony with Deeper Values
Plausibly, if our choices are to count as free, they must be driven by desires we don’t 
mind being moved by (Dworkin 1970). Perhaps they must harmonise with our sec-
ond order volitions, i.e. we must be moved by the first order desires that we want to 
be moved by (Frankfurt 1971). Perhaps, ultimately, we need our choices to harmo-
nise with our deepest values (Watson 1975). It might be thought that our deepest 
system of values, those with which we rationally identify, constitute the “real self”.
There is a strong case for supposing that only conscious processes typically har-
monise with our deeper values. Since a moral outlook needs to be integrated into a 
coherent system, it also needs to be governed by norms of consistency. Unconscious 
processes do not obey these norms (Levy 2011, 2013). Moreover, it’s well known 
that agents often unconsciously process information in ways that run directly coun-
ter to their values; in cases of unconscious bias, agents typically find their behaviour 
reflects attitudes they consciously repudiate; they are often keen to rid themselves 
of the bias, or to take steps to prevent it from influencing their behaviour (Levy 
2013; Levy 2014a, b).
Once again, it is typically argued that access consciousness rather than phenom-
enal consciousness is relevant here; the sorts of processes we can report and subject 
to scrutiny are the sorts we can expect to harmonise with our values. What matters 
is that such processing is governed by norms of rational consistency and may be 
subject to scrutiny on the basis of values. This is what enables it to harmonise with 
our values. This does not require the awareness itself to cause our decisions or to 
precede their initiation.
1.4.2.4  Alternative Possibilities
Alternative possibilities are often thought to be important for moral responsibility, 
though this has been highly controversial since Frankfurt’s famous argument for 
their irrelevance (Frankfurt 1969).
Compatibilists traditionally understand this requirement in terms of a counter-
factual dependence between an agent’s choices and actions. We have already noted 
that this is untouched by epiphenomenalism. Incompatibilists, however, tend to 
have a different understanding of alternative possibilities. They typically require 
that agents are able to do otherwise holding that past the laws of nature constant. 
Determinism seems to preclude alternatives so understood.
As already noted, epiphenomenalism does not entail determinism. Perhaps, how-
ever, Libet-style studies should also be understood as providing evidence for the 
thesis that our choices are causally determined. Soon et  al. (2008) were able to 
predict an agent’s choice between which of two buttons to press (i.e. a decision with 
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a 50% chance of going either way) with 60% accuracy, well before the agents them-
selves became consciously aware of deciding. But this does not constitute compel-
ling evidence for determinism; it does not entail that a single outcome is guaranteed. 
Proponents of indeterminism typically suppose that causation is probabilistic as 
opposed to deterministic. This is consistent with earlier events raising the probabil-
ity of later ones.
1.4.3  Non-Naturalistic Purported Conditions of Freedom
The naturalistic conditions of freedom appear to be untouched by arguments for 
epiphenomenalism, but it is not so obvious that the same will be true of non- 
naturalistic ones.
Sometimes, it is thought that freedom requires Godlike abilities; that free will 
involves being an “unmoved mover”, able to originate actions independently of any 
prior events. There are two features that might seem to be preconditions for this; one 
involves the conscious mind being the ultimate causal source of choices, and the 
other involves immunity from prior causal influence.
1.4.3.1  Conscious Origination
Source incompatibilists typically suppose that determinism threatens free will 
because it threatens the agent’s status as the ultimate source of her own choices and 
actions. Do epiphenomenalist arguments challenge this? It depends on how we 
locate agents. If unconscious brain processes are regarded as part of the agent’s 
efforts, then it’s not obvious that the agent could only be initiating an action if con-
scious phenomena are initiating it. An agent’s mental processes could be doing the 
causal work even if the conscious awareness itself were not involved in the initiation 
of choices.
If consciousness is understood merely as a way of accessing our mental states, 
then this simply doesn’t look like the sort of thing that could intelligibly figure in a 
causal relation. It’s not obvious how the mere availability of states to conscious 
awareness could cause our choices. And with respect to phenomenal consciousness, 
again, it seems strange to suppose that the raw feeling of making a choice could 
cause it (Walter 2014).
If consciousness is going to intelligibly figure as an independent cause, it seems 
that we will need to understand it as something more than just a way in which men-
tal states present themselves to awareness. Rather, we would need to suppose that 
conscious states are part of an independent entity that might exert its own 
influence.
Perhaps consciousness is taken to be the crucial element of a Cartesian soul. If 
we suppose that freedom requires the soul to influence action independently of neu-
ral events, then perhaps it would make sense to suppose that phenomenal 
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 consciousness might be part of something causally influential in its own right. If this 
is what free will requires, then the empirical case for epiphenomenalism, by show-
ing that consciousness arrives too late to the game, would indeed be showing that 
the agent (presumably, identical to the Cartesian soul and not to any neural precur-
sors) could not be the ultimate source of her choices.
1.4.3.2  Immunity from Prior Influence
This requirement might be supplemented with another; perhaps what is required for 
freedom is not merely that our choices are caused by an independent conscious 
entity, but also that these choices are immune from prior causal influence.
Some incompatibilists suppose that free choices must be uncaused (Ginet 2002, 
2007, 2008, 2016; McCann 1998, 2012; Goetz 1988, 2008). Presumably, this rules 
out even probabilistic causation. Does this entail that there can be no correlation 
between an agent’s choices and neural events that precede those choices? This is not 
obvious. Non-causalists usually suppose that an agent’s choices must be rationally 
explicable, even if they are not causally explicable. But suppose that some pattern 
of neural activity is typically associated with positively assessing a potential course 
of action. This pattern would then also be correlated with the presence a positive 
reason to choose it. On the non-causal view, the agent’s choice also needs to corre-
late with the presence of such reasons. We would therefore expect the choice and the 
neural pattern to be correlated to one another as well.
It is only if we presuppose an explicitly non-naturalistic account of the agent and 
her mental processes (e.g. we suppose that there are no correlates between neural 
processes and the agent’s contemplation of reasons) that a non-causal account rules 
out any correlation between the odds of an agent making a particular decision and 
neural precursors.
Suppose we regard the agent as essentially identical to a Cartesian soul, and we 
suppose that an agent can only have free will insofar as any rational explanation of 
her behaviour emanates entirely from the soul independently of any brain processes. 
Libet-style studies certainly seem to cast some doubt on whether agents can meet 
this requirement.
1.5  Epiphenomenalism and Free Will Scepticism
Recall, I argued that, if we are to reach free will scepticism on the basis of evidence 
for epiphenomenalism, we would need to identify some requirement for free will 
that also meets the following criteria:
 1. The requirement must be plausibly inconsistent with epiphenomenalism.
 2. While the requirement must be a necessary condition of free and responsible 
action, it should not also be a prerequisite for any action (even unfree ones).
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 3. The requirement must be consistent with the thesis that the mental supervenes on 
the physical.
I examined three categories of purported requirements for freedom: conditions of 
basic agency, naturalistic conditions of free will, and non-naturalistic conditions of 
free will.
Obviously, none of those conditions that are alleged to be prerequisites for any 
action will be able to meet condition 2: An argument from those conditions is not 
only going to establish free will scepticism, but will also show that there is no 
agency of any sort. This would certainly undermine free will, but it comes with the 
implausible implication that actions do not exist either.
Moreover, we found that the sorts of consciousness that might be potentially 
rendered epiphenomenal by the empirical arguments were likely to be irrelevant to 
the conditions of action. While such arguments might show that phenomenal con-
sciousness occurs after the initiation of a choice, it is not obvious that this timing 
issue is especially relevant to the role of access consciousness, and the empirical 
arguments do not tell us anything about the causal role of intentional or representa-
tional content.
It is only if the latter is shown to be epiphenomenal that we would plausibly have 
a serious threat to agency; while the philosophical arguments might be thought to 
render intentional content epiphenomenal, the empirical arguments do not appear to 
address it at all. The requirement that we be able to act in virtue of intentional con-
tents, if it is a requirement of free will, does not meet condition 2 in any case, and in 
relation to the sorts of epiphenomenalism plausibly entailed by the empirical 
research, doesn’t meet condition 1 either.
Let’s turn to the naturalistic requirements for free will.
The possibility of meeting the purported naturalistic requirements for free will, I 
suggested is not threatened by epiphenomenalism, so these requirements do not 
meet criterion 1.
While our choices can only meet the requirements of being reasons-responsive 
and in harmony with our deeper values if those decisions involve processing of the 
sort that we are typically conscious of, there is no reason to suppose that any sort of 
conscious awareness must cause or even temporally precede such processing in 
order for it to be reasons responsive or to harmonise with our values. And the empir-
ical studies have no bearing at all on whether our choices are causally determined.
Finally, the non-naturalistic purported requirements of freedom do not meet cri-
terion 3. If these are understood so as to genuinely meet criterion 1 (i.e. as involving 
a causal role for consciousness in itself and/or devoid of any correlation with prior 
neural events), this would require us to identify agents with something non- physical; 
e.g. a ghostly soul, which is an unmoved mover and is the ultimate source of choices 
and action. This is inconsistent with the thesis that the mental supervenes on the 
physical.
Such studies arguably ought to matter to someone with a classic Cartesian inter-
actionist view. Since phenomenal consciousness, on this view, resides in an inde-
pendent non-physical mind, and this causally influences brain activity, perhaps 
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phenomenal awareness must precede the initiation of choices. But Cartesian inter-
actionism is hardly popular nowadays. There are reasons to reject it quite indepen-
dently of the empirical case for epiphenomenalism; many of these reasons were 
identified immediately after its inception in the seventeenth century.
As noted earlier, this led other historical theorists to favour monism (idealist and 
materialist) or to favour parallelist or occasionalist analyses of the relation between 
the mental and the physical. The problem is, it’s not obvious that proponents of 
alternatives to interactionism who endorse highly non-naturalistic accounts of free 
will have any good reason to suppose that neuroscientific research tells us anything 
at all about the mind. These views place the mind thoroughly outside of the reach 
of scientific investigation.
Moreover, contemporary philosophers overwhelmingly endorse physicalism. 
Those who take seriously non-naturalistic conditions of freedom are rare. Those 
who endorse those conditions alongside Cartesian interactionism are rarer still (an 
endangered species, if not extinct).
Libet-style studies present no evidence for supposing that we cannot meet natu-
ralistic conditions of freedom. And as for non-naturalistic ones, anyone who takes 
neuroscientific research seriously had overwhelming reason to suppose nobody 
could meet those quite independently of these studies. In contrast, those who main-
tain that we do meet non-naturalistic conditions, for the most part, must regard such 
things as outside of the reach of neuroscientific research.
1.6  Conclusion
The landscape of the free will dispute is largely unaffected by the empirical case for 
epiphenomenalism. Surprisingly, it seems that empirical researchers have been 
prone to presupposing a picture of freedom, from the start, that would be completely 
inconsistent with sort of minimal physicalism upon which the whole enterprise of 
neuroscience is based. Somehow, they are still haunted by the ghost of Cartesian 
interactionism.
Insofar as we endorse a broadly naturalistic and physicalist picture of the mind 
(a picture that I think we have overwhelmingly good reason to embrace), it is not 
obvious that the experimental data provides any serious challenge to meeting the 
conditions of freedom that could plausibly be met consistent with that picture any-
way. In contrast, for anyone who explicitly rejects that picture, the empirical data 
will be regarded as being of dubious relevance from the start.
There are, I believe, compelling reasons on the basis of which to embrace free 
will scepticism. But these reasons have little to do with the presence of unconscious 
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